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Abstract—This work presents a mobile sign-on scheme, which 
utilizes Bluetooth Low Energy beacons for location awareness and 
Attribute-Based Encryption for expressive, broadcast-style key 
exchange. Bluetooth Low Energy beacons broadcast encrypted 
messages with encoded access policies. Within range of the 
beacons, a user with appropriate attributes is able to decrypt the 
broadcast message and obtain parameters that allow the user to 
perform a short or simplified login. The effect is a “traveling” sign-
on that accompanies the user throughout different locations. 
Keywords—attribute-based encryption; location awareness; 
short sign-on; simplified login; key exchange; bluetooth low energy; 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The typical sign-on or login procedure involves a user 
entering a username and password by means of a keyboard. The 
backend system verifies the username and password (or the hash 
of the password) against a database, and then grants, or not, 
access to a system. Large systems, built upon many components 
that interoperate, may utilize the single sign-on scheme, in which 
the user signs on once and gain access to multiple systems. 
This concept is normally static, since the login procedure, 
and the system, assumes the user is at a determined location, 
from which the user signed on to the system. If the user moves 
to another location and switches the login terminal, then the 
previous sign-on is lost and a new sign-on must be performed. If 
the user signs on from a mobile device, then the user can usually 
remain logged in to the system, provided a network connection 
is maintained. 
Modern systems may include location and device awareness 
in various capacities. Microsoft’s and Google’s free services, for 
example, can detect the device type utilized and change their 
interface accordingly (e.g., adjust their service pages to the 
devices’ screen sizes). In addition, in particular in their two-way 
authentication protocols, each device is individually recognized, 
and the sign-on procedure can be simplified for previously 
authenticated devices. 
We envision a secure sign-on scheme that allows the login 
to “travel” with the user, allowing the user to utilize a simplified 
sign-on procedure based on the user’s location. In addition of 
being location-aware, our scheme employs the expressiveness of 
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE [1]) to 
encode access policies that are built on both location and user 
attributes. The access policy is effectively broadcast: the 
backend system does not need to negotiate access attributes with 
the user before allowing the simplified sign-on procedure. If the 
user possesses attributes fulfilling the access policy, then the 
user will be able to acquire parameters to continue with the 
simplified sign-on procedure. 
Bluetooth Low Energy or Bluetooth Smart beacons construct 
indoor location information and policy broadcast in our scheme 
[2]. The user will possess a Bluetooth Low Energy device, such 
as a compatible smartphone ([3], [4]), to receive the beacons. 
Outdoor location and policy broadcast may rely on a 
combination of techniques, such as the same Bluetooth Low 
Energy beacons, GPS, Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi Direct. 
II. CASE SCENARIO 
This scenario details an application of Ciphertext-Policy 
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) for secure location 
awareness and access control. In this scenario, Bluetooth 
beacons, installed around an office space (Fig. 1), transmit an 
encrypted message containing a cryptographic nonce. This 
nonce is encrypted using CP-ABE and encoding the access rules, 
through the predicate, that is desired for the range of that beacon. 
A user with a Bluetooth device, such as the smartphone, 
captures the encrypted transmission and attempts to decrypt it 
utilizing the user’s ABE private key. If the user has sufficient 
attributes to fulfill the encoded predicate in the ABE-encrypted 
message, then the user device will successfully decrypt the 
message and obtain the nonce. 
To be able to perform a simplified, short-login to a computer 
within range of the Bluetooth beacon, the user’s smartphone 
must transmit a “location sign-on.” The location sign-on 
procedure is built as follows: 
• Hash nonce + user password. 
• Calculate a new nonce, named c-nonce (for client 
nonce). The c-nonce is generated according to a token 
authenticator algorithm. In this case, both the user 
device and the backend know the c-nonce seed and thus 
can calculate the same c-nonce for the same time period. 
• Encrypt hash(nonce + password) using c-nonce as 
symmetric key. 
• Encrypt concatenation of username + 
c-nonce(hash(nonce + password)) using nonce as 
symmetric key. 
• Transmit login[nonce[username + 
c-nonce(hash(nonce+password))]] through Bluetooth. 
The beacon will receive the transmission, and the backend 
system will attempt to decrypt the message (the location sign-
on) first by decrypting using the current nonce, retrieving the 
username, then (from the username seed in the backend 
database) calculating and using the c-nonce as a key to decrypt 
the rest of the message. If the location sign-on is successful, then 
the backend system may allow a quick-login for the user, and 
will in addition know about the location of the user. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Bluetooth Low Energy radios distributed around an office. 
In the case depicted, the beacon nonce also changes 
periodically (it can also be generated using a token authenticator 
algorithm, but the seed is only known by the beacon). The seed 
for the c-nonce, however, is known by both the user smartphone 
and the beacon system, and it is unique to a user. The purpose of 
the beacon nonce is to provide a pseudorandom message that a 
user device can, or not, decrypt. As it changes periodically, a 
user device must also submit a new location login periodically, 
otherwise it will not be possible to perform a quick-login (or not 
even a full login, depending on the system configuration). The 
purpose of the c-nonce is to further authenticate the user; since 
both nonces change periodically, a replay attack is deterred. 
It should be noted that the c-nonce is never transmitted from 
the user device to the beacon. Since the beacon system knows 
the user seed, it can calculate the current c-nonce and use it as a 
key to decrypt the user’s location login. In addition, when 
transmitting passwords according to the description here, the 
passwords are never taken as plaintext, but as hashes of the 
actual passwords. The only moment at which a password exists 
as plaintext is when a user is entering the password in a field by 
means of a keyboard. 
A.  The “Location Sign-On” as a Key Exchange Protocol 
The “location sign-on” procedure, described earlier, can be 
summarized as: 
1. Broadcast a symmetric key using CP-ABE. 
2. Use the symmetric key to encrypt username and an 
encrypted form of password and nonce. 
Effectively, CP-ABE is being used here as a key exchange 
protocol. We may highlight the following characteristics about 
this key exchange, and as compared to traditional key exchange 
formats: 
• ABE is expressive, allowing access rules to be encoded 
in the message itself based on attributes. The message 
can then be broadcast through insecure medium. The 
primary access decision, then, need not rely on database 
access, or extended communication exchange between 
user and backend, or on specific users (but on “classes” 
of users). The decision is virtually transferred to the 
user, as a result of the user being able, or not, to decrypt 
the broadcast message. 
• Access rules can be changed on the fly simply by re-
encrypting the new access predicate in the broadcast 
message. 
• The key broadcast using ABE is typically one-to-many, 
and not one-to-one as traditional key exchanges. It 
should be noted, however, that some key exchange 
protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman’s, provide key 
exchange for parties that have no prior knowledge of 
each other. The method described here requires that 
ABE private keys be distributed before through secure 
channels, such that a user can properly decrypt the 
broadcast messages if this user fulfills the predicate. 
III. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTATION AND FUTURE WORK 
Initial experimentation focuses on implementing the key 
exchange algorithm. By means of simulation, we test the 
effectiveness of the exchange and simplified login scheme when 
users are within range of different beacon areas. Our future work 
involves investigating the security of the proposed scheme 
according to security models, how to address the issues of key 
revocation and update, and analyze its performance in when 
subject to several attack vectors. 
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